We investigate the provision of liquidity by different trader types on the Australian Securities Exchange using data that spans an extended sample period of 2003 to 2009. We find the familiar intraday U-shaped pattern in order volume and frequency where the lunch time session is associated with a lower level of order placement activity. We also find institutional traders use more limit orders than market orders and that their relative use of limit to market orders is higher than retail traders. The use of limit orders by institutional traders has increased substantially in 2009 and reflects the growth in algorithmic and high frequency trading. When studying the price impact of market orders, we find institutional traders are better informed than retail traders. While we do not find the provision of liquidity by institutional traders to be driven by information, there is some evidence from 2009 that liquidity provision is information driven. JEL Classifications : G10; G12; G13
The evolution of informed liquidity provision and consumption: Evidence from an order driven market
Introduction
The issue of liquidity provision and consumption in securities markets is a significant source of concern for market participants, regulators and stock exchanges. With the uprise of algorithmic and high frequency traders, it is unclear which traders are the providers of liquidity when the need for liquidity is most wanted. This is even more pertinent in an order In examining the provision of liquidity, we study the contribution by institutional and retail traders over the trade day and how their provision of liquidity varies with market conditions.
It is especially important to understand the motive behind institutional investors' liquidity provision and consumption as these investors constitute the majority of daily order submissions and trading volume in the market. This forms the first objective of the paper.
The second objective is to examine whether institutional investors' role in liquidity provision and consumption is information driven. In other words, are they informed?
Prior research on liquidity provision focuses on the order choice strategy of informed and uninformed traders. Although a large number of theoretical models propose that informed traders would always use market orders given the short lived nature of their information, this
proposition was challenged by a recent experimental study by and by recent empirical studies that show a preference for limit orders by informed traders Chakravarty and Holden 1995) . Wang and Zu (2008) provide the theoretical rationale for this preference and Kaniel and Liu (2004) argue that limit orders of informed traders are in fact more informative than their market orders.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we examine the liquidity provision and order choice strategy of institutional traders and the change in the strategies over the course of the trading day. Our study complements the work by , who test the experimental study of and provide empirical evidence from a hybrid market. Our paper differs in that it investigates the provision of liquidity on an electronic limit order market and provides empirical evidence to investigate the hypotheses proposed by that are based on an electronic market setting.
Second, we extend the study by by investigating their assumption that institutional traders are informed. Specifically, we test whether institutional traders' liquidity provision (by examining orders of different aggressiveness) is driven by information. Prior studies suggest orders placed by informed traders cause larger and more prolonged price impact. We examine the degree of the informed liquidity provision through the price impact of orders in each aggressiveness categories. Last, we examine the order submission by different trader types over an extended period, allowing us to document any changes in order submission that may have been brought about due to the wide spread use of algorithmic and high frequency trading by institutional traders.
Using a dataset comprising stocks in the ASX50 from the years 2003, 2006 and 2009, we find the familiar intraday U-shaped pattern in order volume and frequency where the lunch time is associated with a lower level of order placement activity. We also find institutional traders place more limit orders than market orders and that institutional traders are more likely to use limit than market orders compared to retail traders. This suggests institutional traders play a vital role in the provision of liquidity on the ASX. 3 The use of limit orders by institutional traders has increased substantially in 2009 and is likely to reflect the growth in algorithmic and high frequency trading. We do not find a similar increase in the use of limit orders by retail traders.
When studying the price impact of market orders using five-and 15-minute horizons, we find evidence to suggest institutional traders are better informed than retail traders. However, we do not find similar results when examining the limit orders placed by the different trader types. In particular, we find the price impact of limit orders is greater for the institutional traders only when using data from a later sample period, i.e., 2009. This is likely associated with the use of algorithmic and high frequency trading where computers are used to profit from short term market making.
Related Literature
The earlier studies on trading strategies suggests informed traders use market orders Glosten 1994; Rock 1990; Seppi 1990 ). These studies often assume trading in a dealer market, traders are eager to act on the information that they possess, and the information is often short-lived. However, more recent studies have shown informed traders also use limit orders, sometimes even more than market orders (Beber and Caglio 2005; .
Harris (1998) predicts that the use of market orders by informed traders will be influenced by their opinion on the persistence of their informational advantage and by transaction costs. For example, if they possess relatively longer-lived information and a wider spread may this may outweigh non-execution risk and encourage informed traders to prefer a combination of both market and limit orders. use an experimental market setting to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. form the view market price is more likely to differ from the true value by a greater extent early on, and that informed traders will use market orders to "pick-off" differences during this "window of opportunity" if mispricing outweighs the cost of immediacy.
As prices systematically update during the trading period an informed trader can instead place limit orders around the true value to earn the bid-ask spread. point out that, in comparison to liquidity traders, informed traders face a far lower risk of adverse selection, the informational advantage of informed traders allows them to price limit orders more aggressively, thereby reducing non-execution risk. It is found that in total informed traders submit more limit orders than liquidity traders, and the difference is statistically significant. empirically investigate the evolution of liquidity in the manner of using a sample of NYSE stocks. They find that institutional (informed) traders price their limit orders more aggressively than retail (liquidity) traders. Over the course of trading day, institutional traders appear to initially use market orders to exploit their informational advantage to earn larger profits, and then to supply liquidity to earn the bid-ask spread.
Liquidity traders behave in a manner consistent with Harris (1998) , by submitting relatively fewer limit orders as the trading period progresses. Harris (1998) predicts that early in the trading period, liquidity traders will typically prefer to use limit orders to avoid paying the cost of immediacy. As the close of trading approaches, non-execution risk increases, so they will switch to a greater proportion of market orders to ensure that their targets are achieved before the market closes. Amongst others, the paper by Lee, Lin, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2004) provides evidence that institutions are more likely to be informed traders, whilst individuals are more likely to be liquidity (or noise) traders.
We extend the work on order placement strategies by examining the relative use of market and limit orders by institutional and retail traders. We also extend the literature by examining To conduct the analysis we divide a trading day into 36 ten-minute intervals from opening 10:00:00 to closing 16:00:00. Data for the first ten-minutes (i.e., 10:00:00 to 10:10:00) after the opening are omitted to avoid any potential confounding effects due to the staggered market opening procedure in practice on the ASX. 5 The twenty minutes before closing is excluded to circumvent contamination of results from the effect of traders' possible abnormal behaviour associated with the market close. 4 According to the ASX website, "The S&P/ASX 50 index comprises the 50 largest stocks by market capitalisation in Australia. The constituent companies represent the biggest national and multi-national publicly listed companies in the Australian equity market. The S&P/ASX 50 index places an emphasis on liquidity and investability." 5 Opening takes place at 10:00 am. Securities open in five groups according to the starting letter of their ASX code. Each group opens two minutes after the previous group. The first group opens at 10:00 am ± 15 seconds and the last group opens at 10:09 ± 15 seconds. 6 At 16:00 market is placed in the pre-closing single price auction (Pre-CSPA) phase, where trading stops and traders are only allowed to submit limit orders. A surge of market orders are usually observed before the Pre-CSPA, so orders placed in the last 20 minutes prior to the auction are excluded from our analysis.
Liquidity provision by different trader types
By using ten-minute intervals, we are able to construct our intra-day variable, limit order submission rate, to investigate traders' order choice between limit and market orders over the trading day and examine the effects of market conditions such as the level of information asymmetry, the adverse selection risk, liquidity, and volatility over the course of the trading day on the order choice.
Since all traders in the market are exposed to similar market wide information and affected by market wide activity, it is likely their order choices are either correlated contemporaneously or dependent on one another's past order submission strategy. To capture the order placement dynamics, we use a vector autoregressive system to model the institutional and retail traders' limit order submission rate. The model is as follows: 
Where SI t and SR t are limit order submission rate by institutional and retail traders, respectively. SI t (SR t ) is calculated as the ratio of limit orders submitted in the number of orders to the sum of market and limit orders submitted by institutional (retail) traders within time interval t. Since a larger SI t and SR t over a certain time interval indicate a greater proportion of limit orders submitted relative to market orders, meaning that traders have chosen to use limit orders, or provide liquidity, more than market orders, or consume 
Informativeness of orders placed by institutional and retail traders
To study the informativeness of orders placed by institutional and retail traders, we examine the price impact of the orders place by the different traders. Price impact is measured by the change in the midpoint price from the time of order submission to five (15) minutes after.
( )
Where MPP is the mid-point price computed as the average of the best bid and ask at the time the order is place. BS_Flag equals 1 if the order is a buy and -1 if the order is a sell.
In order to control for the effects of order size and order aggressiveness, we examine the price impact of the order placed by the different traders in a regression model. Similar to the submission rate model, we use a panel regression with fixed effects in recognition of stock specific factors.
Where DIM is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for in-the-market orders, DAM is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for at-the-market orders, and DInsto is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for orders placed by institutional traders. A general observation from the figures is the greater likelihood by both groups of traders to use limit orders instead of market orders; this is regardless of the metric used to measure volume (i.e., VOL and NUM). 9 The greater use of limit orders is likely a characteristic of the order-driven market examined where trading on the market will only occur if traders are willing to place limit orders. In addition, the figures show institutional traders are relatively more active than the retail traders and institutional traders supply a larger proportion of the limit orders. We examine the traders' relative use of limit orders and informativeness of the limit orders later.
Results

Intraday order placement choice of institutional versus retail traders
The widely documented 'U' shaped pattern in trading volume and volatility in prior studies is also evident in the figures for order submission (VOL) and submission frequency (NUM).
There is relatively more order placement activity in the morning and late afternoon compared 9 In future versions, we will be measuring the volume of executed versus unexecuted limit orders.
to the lunch hours (i.e., 12noon -2pm). This is for both market and limit orders, and also for retail and institutional traders. By contrast, the pattern in order size is comparatively less distinct. While the 'U' shaped patterns documented are evident in all three subsample periods (i.e., 2003, 2006 and 2009) , there is a substantial increase in the number of orders (both market and limit) placed by institutional traders in 2009. This is accompanied by a substantial decrease in the size of orders placed by institutional traders. This is likely to be associated with the increased use of algorithmic and computerised trading where a large number of smaller orders are automatically generated by computer algorithms. We do not see similar increase in order submission and decrease in order size for orders placed by retail traders. Table 1 shows the use of limit orders and market orders during the three sessions: morning [Insert Table 1 [Insert Table 2 about here]
The distinct intra-day pattern of order choice by institutional traders and the retail traders as shown in table 1 and figure 1 is further tested in this section. The VAR panel regression (with fixed effect between stocks) for order choice of the two groups of traders is estimated and results are presented in Table 3 . The institutions' order choice, proxied by the ratio of their limit order on their total order submission, is regressed on the time-of-the-day dummies and the matrix of control variables. Significant coefficients for morning and afternoon dummy variables indicate a strong time dependence of institutional order submission choice. It is noted that the explanatory power of time-of-the-day dummy variables are significant even after controlling for order size, order submission frequency, volatility, transaction cost and the change in depth on both bid and ask side of the order book. Furthermore, the inter-day effect is significant even after the seasonal effect of the spread and the volatility is taken into account, indicated in the two sets of interaction variables, one between the volatility and the time-of-the-day dummies, and the other between the spread and the time-of-the-day dummies.
For the purpose of comparison, the order choice regression results for retail traders in the market are also presented in Table 3 . First of all, most independent variables that predict the order submission choice of institutions also predict that of retails in the same direction, but to a different degree of significance. For instance, the limit order submission is still strong in the afternoon even after the effect of larger spread in the afternoon deduces more market orders is taken into account. Retail traders on the other hand are more sensitive to this effect, showing insignificant afternoon limit order submission dependence after the negative effect of large spread. Secondly, it is noticed that the depth on the same side encourages retail limit order submission, whereas this variable does not have any predictive power on institutions.
This suggests that retail traders become impatient when they observe a thick depth on the same side, consistent with empirical findings of Ranaldo (2004) [Insert Table 3 about here] 4.3 The aggressiveness of limit orders by institutional vs. retail traders
In Table 4 , we present statistics on the use of orders of different aggressiveness. In particular,
we classify the limit orders into three additional categories: (1) in-the-market orders, (2) atthe-market orders, (3) behind-the-market orders. Orders in all three categories are limit orders that are less aggressive than market orders with behind-the-market orders being the least aggressive. In-the-market orders are bid or ask limit orders that are placed with prices between the best bid and ask on the market. At-the-market orders are limit sell (buy) orders that have a limit price that is equals to the best sell (bid) place on the market. Behind-the-market orders are limit sell (buy) order that have a limit price that is higher (lower) that the best sell (bid) on the market.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Conditioned on the order examined is a limit order submitted by an institutional trader, it is likely that the limit order is an at-the-market limit order (see Panel A). While the proportion of the different limit orders used have remained generally stable over time, the number of behind-the-market limit orders used by institutional traders have increased in 2009.
Furthermore, the size of these orders has decreased substantially from 11,098 to 1,839. The observed increased use of behind-the-market orders used by institutional traders is also evident for retail traders.
With respect to order size, we find institutions trade in larger sizes with their average market orders more than three times larger than their retail counterpart in 2003. However, the average market order submitted by institutional traders has decreased over the sample period.
In 2009, market orders submitted by institutional traders are on average smaller than market orders submitted by a retail trader. The pattern of the limit order sizes is however similar across two trader types, where the smallest orders are observed between the best bid and ask prices, next behind the best quotes and the largest limit orders are placed at the best quotes.
Secondly, in terms of order frequency, although both institutions and retails overall use more limit orders than market orders, the composition of their limit orders is remarkably different.
While 56% of institutions limit orders are placed either on or better than the best quotes, 63%
of retail limit orders are placed behind the market. (how to link it to previous regression results) …
Price impact of orders
To further investigate the proposition that institutional trades are motivated by information, we examine the price impact of institutional orders of differing aggressiveness and compare the price impact of institution orders to those of retail orders. The results for the univariate analysis are presented in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 We conduct additional analysis on the price impact of different limit order types used by the two different trader types in a regression model. The results for the regression corroborates our findings in the univariate analysis.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
We find at-the-market limit orders are associated with larger price impact than the behindthe-market limit orders (i.e., the base case). In-the-market limit orders have the largest price impact among all the limit orders examined. We do not find limit orders placed by By using a dataset comprising stocks in the ASX50, we find the familiar U-shaped pattern in order volume and frequency where order placement activity is lowest during the lunch time period. We also find institutional traders place more limit orders than market orders and that institutional traders are more likely to use limit than market orders compared to retail traders.
This suggests institutional traders play a pertinent role in the provision of liquidity on the ASX. In our study of the patterns over the three subsample periods, we find the use of limit orders by institutional traders has increased substantially in 2009 and is likely to be associated with the growth in algorithmic and high frequency trading. By contrast, we do not find a similar increase in the use of limit orders by retail traders.
In the second part of our analysis, we extend the study by by investigating the assumption that institutional traders are informed. Specifically, we test whether the limit orders strategies adopted by institutional traders are driven by information. We do so by measuring the price impact of orders in each aggressiveness categories. In our analysis of the price impact of market orders, we find evidence to suggest institutional traders are better informed than retail traders. However, we do not find the limit orders placed by the institutional traders to be motivated by information.
We also examine the order submission by different trader types over an extended period. This allows us to document any changes in order submission that may have been brought about due to the wide spread use of algorithmic and high frequency trading by institutional traders.
In particular, we find the price impact of limit orders is greater for the institutional traders only when using data from the later sample period, i.e., 2009. This is likely to be an effect of algorithmic and high frequency where computers are used to profit from market making. This table presents the summary statistics and Spearman correlation coefficients for all variables used in the model. Panel A presents the mean, standard deviation, and median for the variables in each of the three sub-sample periods. SI (SR) is the ratio of limit orders submitted in the number of orders to the sum of market and limit orders submitted by institutional (retail) traders. SPRD is the spread, calculated as half of the difference between the best bid and ask price. Volatility, VOL t-1 , is computed as the sum of the squared returns over the interval, and the average change in depth at the best bid and ask prices on the same side (∆OWN t-1 ) as the order, and the opposing side (∆OPP t-1 ) of the order immediately before submission. Panel B presents the Spearman correlation coefficients for the dependent variables (the first two variables) in the current period, and the independent variables (the rest of the variables) in the lag period. The correlation coefficients are computed for each stock and then the average is presented in the table. in bid-ask midpoint 5 and 15 minutes after the submission of orders with different degree of aggressiveness during morning, lunchtime, and afternoon period, respectively, by institutional and retail traders over the three distinctive sample periods. For buy orders, the changes in midpoint price ∆mpp = mpp t+5 -mppt t ; for sell orders, ∆mpp = mpp t+5 -mppt t . Wilcoxon tests are employed to test the significance in the deference of price impact from orders placed by institutional traders and retail traders. ** denotes statistical significance at 1%.
